The battle to introduce proportional representation into the UK has reached an uneasy draw, with PR systems apparently well-established in the two devolved nations, Scotland and Wales, as well as in the Greater London Assembly (GLA). These three systems are the most important mainland ones and share some common institutional features. In addition Northern
Ireland has a well-established tradition of using the Single Transferable Vote (STV) for its distinctive party system. New institutional forms also remain possible locales for an extension of PR systems. The GLA pattern will be replicated in any English regional assemblies established in the next two years. Scottish local government may shift over to STV elections. And if direct elections for the House of Lords are ever brought in, some form of PR seems inevitable (see Dunleavy and Margetts, 1999b) . So the UK has decisively entered on a possibly protracted phase of co-existence between PR and plurality rule elections, of which the core are the three British AMS systems. Here we examine how they have fared in terms of delivering proportional results, representing the votes cast by electors without artificial distortion, and reflecting or distorting the pattern of alignments. We sketch the devolved systems key features and examine how deviations from proportionality might be applied to them. The experience of British AMS systems so far has some key implications for the future reform of Westminster voting system.
British AMS systems
The salient features of the Scottish, Welsh and London systems are sketched in Table 1 . As in the well-known German and New Zealand systems, citizens vote twice, to choose a local representative and to take part in a list PR election at regional or sub-regional level. The list PR election is applied in a 'top-up' manner, compensating as much as feasible for seats distortions introduced at the constituency stage. Unlike overseas AMS systems which divide seats 50:50 between the two levels, the British systems all have a preponderance of constituency representation, especially marked in Wales where two thirds of seats are chosen by plurality rule. (An extreme form of the same philosophy was also followed by the Jenkins Commission whose unimplemented proposals for Westminster elections are shown for comparison in Table 1 . They proposed that five sixths of seats should be locally elected, with an absolute minimum of top-up seats, but with the additional vote (AV) used instead of plurality rule in the local contests -see Dunleavy and Margetts, 1999a) .
The other strong feature of the Scottish and Welsh systems is that relatively small subregions are used for the top-election, which keeps the effective number of seats in that election (the 'district magnitude') down to relatively small levels. Obviously the larger the effective number of seats the more fine-grain can be the match between votes shares and seats. In Scotland and Wales parties essentially need 5 or 6 per cent of the vote in a subregion respectively to win a seat. The GLA election is an at-large London election, and in theory any party securing a 4 per cent share is guaranteed representation. In practice, it is possible for a favourable distribution of other parties' remainder votes to result in a party winning less than 4 per cent to be elected, and fear of a British National Party success lead to the imposition of a 5 per cent legal threshold in London. Note: The inclusion threshold is the minimum level of the vote on which a party could win a seat, if conditions such as the fragmentation of the vote were optimal. The exclusion threshold is the level a party needs to win in order to be guaranteed a seat (Rae et al., 1971) . Both thresholds given here are the minimum feasible levels. In London there is a legal threshold: parties must win 5 per cent of the list vote across the capital to secure representation. In the Jenkins system these figures assume a basically proportional allocation of local seats between major parties. Where this condition does not hold, the threshold for winning top-up seats could be much higher. For detailed consultants' report on why and how the areas were defined as they are for the London system and the Jenkins report, see Dunleavy and Margetts (1998a,b) .
Assessing deviation from proportionality
There are three main ways of measuring how far systems allocate seats not in relation to vote shares, all of which have significant problems with them:
• DV (the conventional deviation from proportionality measure) subtracts parties' vote shares from their seats shares, adds up the absolute values of the resulting differences (the deviations) ignoring the positive or negative signs, and then divides the resulting total by 2 (to eliminate the double-counting that would otherwise occur). DV has a ready intuitive meaning -it denotes the proportion of members of the legislature who occupy seats to which they are not entitled in virtue of their party's share of the overall vote. Put another way, it
shows the proportion of seats that would have to be redistributed to achieve a complete fit between seats distributions and electorate's actual pattern of alignments.
In practical terms the minimum DV score will always be shaped by the total number of seats available in the whole election district (at both stages). In polities with multiple electoral districts (but not in London, which is a single electoral district) there may also be compensating effects across districts where a well-established party that is under-represented in one district does better elsewhere. The combined effect of these factors is that minimum DV is invariably at least 2 per cent (rather than zero) and in most cases the effective minimum at national level (and hence a benchmark for Scotland and Wales) will be around 4 per cent.
In practice, the lowest feasible level of DV is mostly driven by quite another factorthe proportion of the vote going to 'other' parties, that is very small political groupuscles with under 1 per cent support, which are too small and fragmented to win representation. If voters choose to extensively fragment their votes in this way (as they often may in newly established voting systems, for instance) then there is no conceivable set of arrangements that can lower the DV score below the combined vote share of the groupuscles.
• The DV-1 score is an easy to implement way of allowing for this effect. Here we compute the conventional DV score but excluding the 'other' vote going to parties or candidates with less than 1 per cent of the vote. The logic of this measure is that no electoral system (of any type) is likely to afford representation to small political groupuscles or candidates who attract less than 1 per cent of the vote. Across different elections, and notwithstanding the arguments of Cox (1997) to the contrary, the proportion of the vote going to these elements may vary, especially in new electoral systems such as those here. Yet conventional DV will add these non-defects to the charge sheet against a system, overstating The main problem with the DV and the DV-1 scores is that they have no useful fixed maximum value. This limitation is a serious one, since ideally we want our indices to run from 0 to 100 per cent. In fact a DV score of 100% can only arise if all the seats go to a party that gets no votes at all, a nonsensical result in a liberal democracy and hence not a relevant point of reference against which to measure performance. (Readers new to this field should be warned that some of the older literature on electoral systems did use this wholly inappropriate point of reference to give meaningless 'proportionality index' scores constructed as 100% minus DV, a nonsense number).
• Alternative DV (ADV) copes with this limitation by relativizing the DV score by reference to the size of the largest party's vote share. The intuition here is that the highest possible value of DV that can be racked up within a liberal democracy arises if all the seats were to go to the largest party (a common result in UK local government elections, for instance, where one-party councils can endure for years in some areas -see Dunleavy and Margetts, 1999c) . If this is indeed the most extreme disproportional result that we would be prepared to recognize as still occurring in a liberal democracy, then we can scale ADV scores against it. We multiply the DV score by 100 and then divide by the size of the 'remainder' vote after subtracting the vote share of the largest party (V 1 ):
The ADV score has a ready intuitive meaning, measuring in a consistent way how far a polity is on a dimension from being a perfect democracy (0) to not being a liberal democracy at all (100). For instance, an ADV score of 48 per cent denotes a voting system that is halfway to ceasing to be democratic. However, the effective minimum score for ADV will of course be considerably above zero and higher than for DV (depending on the size of the largest party's vote). For instance, the practicable minimum conventional DV score of around 4 per cent would translate to an ADV score of around 8 per cent with a largest party on half the vote, or of 5 per cent with the largest party on 20 per cent support.
• The least squares DV measure (LDV) handles computing deviations in a different way. First we square all the individual (seats minus votes) deviations (which automatically gets rid of the minus signs), then sum these up and divide by two (to avoid double counting), and then take the square root of the resultant number. LDV closely follows the DV score itself except that it yields much lower scores, because the measure is chiefly influenced by deviations in the largest parties' seats and votes. The squaring operation, followed later on by seeking a square root, tends to automatically render insignificant deviations in seats won by the smallest parties, which contribute only negligibly to changing LDV scores. Hence LDV has been strongly advocated for use in comparative politics research by some writers who see it as irrelevant in this context how very small parties are treated and want to concentrate only on the handling of significant political groupings (see especially Lijphardt, 1994, 58-62) .
However, for the purposes of analysing proportionality within the same political system over time it is hard to see what on earth the advantages of LDV are supposed to be. It simply produces an artificially low DV score in a disguised mathematical manner that is not transparent for most readers. Furthermore the score number is without any intuitive meaning whatsoever, unlike the DV, DV -1 and ADV scores. In the analysis below we include LDV scores for completeness' sake and in case they are of use to other analysts. But we regard the measure as without merit. A much better and more explicit way to handle the problem of the small party votes is to compute DV-1 as above. In this way readers can make their own choice of which score they think most useful or appropriate, without the behind-the-scenesmanipulation qualities of the LDV method.
The performance of the Scottish, Welsh and London AMS systems
The basic features of the two elections so far for the Scottish Parliament and Welsh Assembly are shown in Table 2 Nonetheless we can also trace out some important implications of the remaining levels of disproportionality by looking at the patterns of seats and coalitional power that results, shown in Table 4 . In Scotland Labour's decline meant that it slipped further away from the threshold needed for majority control, to the point where it can now only barely pass 
Conclusions -the need for further reform
To ask any mixed election system to cope with the historic legacy of Labour's massive predominance (in plurality rule terms) in Scotland and Wales was a pretty tall order. The
Scottish system has responded reasonably well, achieving creditable levels of DV scores.
There seems reason to believe that the problems that remain ( London experience) that a national AMS system would lead to a considerable splintering of top-up stage votes away from the major parties, and a considerable increase in the vote for 'other' parties, many of them unlikely to win representation. We conclude therefore that the Jenkins Commission's hope that broad proportionality could be obtained with only one sixth top-up seats is no longer tenable. At a minimum the experience of British AMS so far suggests that achieving broad proportionality at Westminster elections will require many more top-up seats, certainly no fewer than a quarter and ideally at least the one third level used in Wales. There might also be a good case for envisaging larger top-up stage subregions than the counties in which the Jenkins Commission reposed its faith. Larger subregions of around 20 to 25 seats, in tandem with a legal threshold of 4 to 5 per cent in the regional vote, would enhance the likelihood of being able to represent the more diversified patterns of alignment which continue to develop in contemporary Britain, yet without encouraging a trend to further fragmentation of the vote that no election system is likely to be able to represent. 
